Tehran appears to be waging a war across multiple arenas and phases, guided by calculations of deterrence, psychological balance, and strategic rhythm management. Historically, Iran tends toward what can be described as a “controlled war” without sliding into full-scale conflict—that is, delivering calculated strikes that demonstrate capability while keeping the door to negotiation slightly ajar.
The media escalation accompanying the military operations reflects a parallel battle over global public opinion. Modern wars, as demonstrated by the experiences of Vietnam and Iraq, are not decided solely on the battlefield, but also in the arena of image and public perception.
Accordingly, Tehran is keen to showcase strikes at sensitive moments and in surprising formats to maximize psychological impact, particularly within the United States and Israel, where public opinion remains a pressure factor on decision-makers. However, overreliance on the opponent’s “moral defeat” remains contingent on Iran’s ability to avoid escalatory reactions that could push the conflict to a higher and more dangerous level.
In contrast, the hypothesis of “mutual attrition” has emerged, invoked by some analysts who have appeared in recent days on several satellite channels or written articles drawing on the experience of the 1980s.
It is true that history offers evidence of major military industries benefiting from prolonged conflicts, but applying this rule to the current reality requires methodological caution. The international system today is far more complex, and the interlinkages of energy and financial markets make the cost of sliding into an open regional war far higher for all parties, including the United States.
Meanwhile, Washington is operating within a more complex equation than appears on the surface. The U.S. administration is working under dual pressure: the need to preserve military deterrence credibility on the one hand, and the sensitivity of public opinion to human losses on the other. The American experience from Vietnam to Iraq has shown that the image of a soldier returning in a coffin may be more influential than the results of the battle itself.
At the heart of the equation stands Israel as a key actor that prefers developments to unfold in its favor without incurring losses. Its limited geographic depth, the sensitivity of its internal front to long-range missiles, and its heavy reliance on American cover all push it generally to favor high-impact strikes rather than engagement in a prolonged regional war. This explains, so far, an operational pattern that leans toward surgical precision rather than comprehensive explosion.
As for the Gulf states, they are today far from desiring to be drawn into an open war, after years of working to reduce escalation and diversify security and economic partnerships. Therefore, the hypothesis of attrition targeting the Gulf remains theoretically possible but not likely, in light of the pragmatic behavior these capitals have followed in recent years. Most likely, these capitals will seek to contain the war rather than fuel it, while strengthening their defenses in preparation for worst-case scenarios.
Economically, the most dangerous escalation scenarios remain linked to the Strait of Hormuz and global energy markets and supply chains. Any major disruption in the flow of oil and food could push prices to elevated levels.
For Sudan, the repercussions will not be distant. Rising oil prices will directly pressure the import bill and increase demand for foreign currency, potentially fueling inflation and weakening the Sudanese pound. Yet the other face of the crisis carries a latent opportunity: economic history shows that periods of geopolitical turmoil drive investors toward hard assets, foremost among them gold.
Here the most important question emerges: does Sudan possess the institutional and regulatory infrastructure that enables it to convert rising gold prices into real gains, or will a large portion of production continue to leak through shameful smuggling channels?
On the broader strategic level, ideas such as expanding oil storage, deepening partnerships with China and Egypt, and re-engaging with Malaysia may appear promising options, but they remain contingent on the Sudanese state’s ability to provide the necessary economic and logistical stability.
States do not benefit from regional storms merely because of geographic proximity, but through smart planning and possession of effective implementation tools.
Domestically, the regional escalation revives the recurring question about the structure of decision-making in Sudan.
What is required is not rhetoric but action—tight coordination between the Sovereignty Council, the Council of Ministers, and the security and foreign affairs apparatus to formulate a balanced position that preserves national interests and reduces potential economic impacts, placing the safety of the state and the citizen at the forefront of priorities.
In this context, the convening of the Security and Defense Council on Sunday under the chairmanship of Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan gains importance in examining developments of the regional war, reflecting an official engagement with the possibility of spillover effects into the .
The reassurance regarding the security situation performs a dual function: calming public opinion and raising the government’s level of readiness. However, the Sudanese experience, like others, confirms that security meetings remain only a first step, while the real test lies in the speed of translating assessments into tangible executive measures.
Politically, Sudan appears inclined toward cautious positioning and calling for the primacy of dialogue, a rational choice in a highly fluid regional environment. Yet the challenge lies in managing the war economy through monitoring markets, protecting supply chains, and enhancing coordination among decision centers.
Many states are not exhausted by transformations themselves, but by energy bills, financing volatility, and trade disruptions.
According to #Face_the_Truth, Iran is managing the confrontation with a long-breath mindset, while the United States is moving within a deterrence equation constrained by domestic considerations.
The region stands on the edge of a fragile balance between containment and explosion. For Sudan, the current moment is a test of the state’s ability to read the storm before its winds arrive. In times of major transformations, states do not survive on wishes, but on vigilant calculations, effective institutions, and wise vision that knows when to avoid the wind… and when to harness the storm as an opportunity for construction.
Wishing you continued health and well-being.
Tuesday, March 3, 2026
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