The war in Sudan has turned into a regional crisis with security, economic, and humanitarian dimensions, threatening to reshape the balance of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
The recent escalation by the Rapid Support Forces militia, which targeted humanitarian aid convoys in North Kordofan, followed by a sharp Saudi statement, European and British sanctions, and an unprecedented regional consensus, reveals that regional and international actors have indeed begun to redefine the Rapid Support Forces militia as an outlaw entity, approaching the description of a “terrorist organization.”
However, this project, which long sheltered under regional and international “umbrellas,” is today facing a historic moment of exposure, placing it at the threshold of the political and security “guillotine.” As an economic tool employed within a cross-border project, it was supported by some political forces that gambled on chaos as a means of empowerment, and on dismantling the state as an entry point to redraw maps and spheres of influence.
Following the statement issued yesterday by the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemning the recent attacks that targeted World Food Programme convoys, the Al-Kuwaik Military Hospital, and buses of displaced persons in North and South Kordofan, and describing them as war crimes, a striking statement was issued by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, representing a qualitative shift in its approach to the crisis.
It does not merely condemn, but links the violations to the breach of the Jeddah Declaration, and reaffirms the protection of civilians, the unity of Sudan, and the rejection of foreign interference.
This discourse, as it appears, does not target the militia alone, but sends a message to the regional and international powers that have continued to bet on keeping the Rapid Support Forces at the negotiating table in order to reinsert them once again into the security and political landscape.
From this discourse, the statement is understood as a clear declaration by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of the end of one phase and the beginning of another—a phase that had been marked by repeated attempts to build a regional consensus to contain the conflict, most notably through the Jeddah Platform, which resulted in an agreement between the army and the Rapid Support Forces on May 11, 2023—and the opening of a new phase carrying firm and clear political messages: that the state alone is the legitimate reference for armed authority, and that any armed entity outside its institutions will have no acceptable place in the national scene.
Likewise, the European Union’s imposition last week of sanctions on field and financial leaders within the militia, and Britain’s freezing of the assets of its financial adviser, reflects a shift in pressure from the political level to the infrastructure of war. These measures represent painful blows targeting funding networks, drones, and money laundering, cutting off what remains of the militia’s lifelines.
Furthermore, the complementarity of roles between Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey regarding the necessity of ending the presence of the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan carries an important significance. Despite their differing interests, these states have found themselves facing a common threat that extends beyond Sudan to the security of the Red Sea, illegal migration, and networks of weapons and drugs.
This regional and international harmony of positions means that the militia has lost its regional and international protective umbrella and has become politically and security-wise besieged.
Domestically, the structure of the militia is fracturing within its social bases. Discontent among what remains of the field leadership, the failure of the Tasees group led by Al-Ta’ayashi and the Somoud group led by Dr. Abdullah Hamdok and other political backers to gain any international legitimacy, and the transformation of the crimes of El Geneina, El Fasher, and El Nahud into a moral burden that follows them in every forum—all are indicators that the project has lost its .
With the escalation of “Kordofan Flood” operations, the retreat of defenses, and the flight of mercenaries, the scene comes together: a front that is eroding, an exposed back, and a blocked future.
These accelerating developments are ending the project of the Rapid Support Forces that is greedy for resources and power, transforming it into a cross-border network active in smuggling, illegal migration, and coordination with outlawed groups—suggesting the transfer of the conflict to a new level that threatens the security of Sudan’s neighbors.
Here, the question is no longer about the future of the militia inside Sudan, but about the cost of its survival on the entire region. When an armed entity becomes a source of threat to all, classifying it as a terrorist organization becomes a logical political option, not merely a legal measure.
The paradox lies in the fact that the Rapid Support Forces, which were designed as a tool for control and terrorizing opponents, have today become a political, legal, and moral burden on all who bet on them. The internal and regional umbrella that granted them room for movement has turned into a guillotine—not because of a change in Saudi Arabia’s position, but because of the reordering of regional and international forces and the confrontation of an entity that has broken all frameworks of legitimacy.
According to #Face_of_Truth, the convergence of international pressure, regional consensus, battlefield advances, and internal erosion draws the contours of a decisive moment in Sudan’s war—a moment that may lead to a complete redefinition of the nature of the conflict, its parties, and the tools for dealing with it. Either the Sudanese state is restored as the sole framework for legitimacy and national sovereignty, or morals and values collapse and geography is left prey to the war economy.
Between these two options, Sudan stands on the edge of a new history, now being shaped at an accelerating pace.
With best wishes for health and well-being.
Sunday, 8 February 2026
Shglawi55@gmail.com
