The issue of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has returned to the forefront, not merely as a technical dispute, but as a full-fledged political case directly linked to the question of water security in the Nile Valley.
The message from U.S. President Donald Trump to his Egyptian counterpart Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, followed by Sudanese-Egyptian interaction and Ethiopian silence, revealed that the crisis has moved from a phase of managing disagreement to a phase of testing wills over who holds the right to determine the fate of Nile waters.
The inclusion of the GERD within U.S. policy priorities cannot be separated from a broader vision of security and stability in East Africa and the Nile Valley, where water security is viewed as one of the pillars of national security and as a political-developmental file. In this sense, the proposed U.S. mediation represents an attempt to recalibrate the negotiating balance and break the deadlock that has plagued the file after years of unproductive efforts.
In this context, the Sudanese position came swiftly and positively, through a tweet by President Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan on the “X” platform, in which he announced Khartoum’s support for the U.S. President’s initiative and affirmed the pursuit of sustainable solutions that preserve rights and support regional security and stability. The significance of this position lies not only in its content, but also in its timing and medium; Sudan was keen to declare its political stance directly, reflecting its awareness of the sensitivity of the moment and its desire to entrench its position as a principal party in any forthcoming negotiation track, rather than a mere recipient of its outcomes.
Sudan, by virtue of its position between the source and the downstream, and the linkage of its water security to the rules of filling, operation, and coordination between dams, sees the absence of an organized solution not as a theoretical risk, but as a direct threat to national and regional stability.
Conversely, the Egyptian position came through a post by President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi on several digital platforms, in which he welcomed Trump’s message and reaffirmed the centrality of the Nile River issue as the lifeline of the Egyptian people, stressing adherence to the principles of international law and the obligation to cause no harm. This swift response reflects a stable Egyptian doctrine that views the Nile file as an existential issue that does not accept time management or reliance solely on good intentions.
Cairo seized the American signal as an opportunity to restore the international track and establish a clear legal reference, in the face of a reality imposed by Ethiopia through unilateral filling and operation without a binding agreement. Therefore, the Egyptian response came as an early political move to set expectations and define the limits of what is acceptable.
As for the Ethiopian silence, it is the most telling element of the scene regarding the depth of the dilemma. The absence of any official reaction reflects an approach based on controlling the political tempo. Addis Ababa, which for years built its discourse on sovereignty and rejection of internationalization, now finds itself facing an initiative that returns the file to the international arena and confronts it with a key question: does it accept negotiation over the rules governing the management of the dam, or does it continue managing the crisis through a fait accompli logic grounded in a completed construction reality? Silence here represents room for maneuver and a means of gauging the seriousness of U.S. mediation and whether it carries real pressure tools or merely a political offer.
This divergence in reactions reveals three intertwined political paths. Sudan moves with a balancing mindset, seeking to reduce risks, maximize gains, and preserve its role as a balanced mediator. Egypt moves with a preemptive mindset to prevent the consolidation of a water reality that threatens its national security. Ethiopia, meanwhile, moves with a time-management mindset, attempting to turn the existing dam reality into a starting point for negotiation rather than a subject of negotiation itself. Between these paths, the United States seeks to reintroduce itself as a mediator capable of bringing the parties together, at a moment when other international powers, such as China, are competing for influence in East Africa and the Nile Basin.
Returning to the Declaration of Principles signed in Khartoum by the three countries in 2015 reveals that the crisis was never about the absence of references, but rather about the weakness of enforcement mechanisms. The ten principles contained in the agreement—cooperation, non-harm, equitable use, information exchange, and peaceful settlement of disputes—remain theoretically valid for producing a balanced solution. However, their practical through unilateral filling transformed the text from a framework for consensus into a legally suspended reference.
Notably, Sudan had signed a bilateral agreement with Ethiopia on October 26, 2022, to regulate the filling and operation of the GERD, including the determination of water quantities, filling and operation schedules, information exchange, and guarantees for dam safety in line with expert recommendations, along with continuous technical and ministerial coordination mechanisms. This unilateral agreement with Ethiopia justifies Sudan’s strategic position, as approximately 20 million people live along riverbanks, and agricultural lands along the Blue Nile and the main Nile constitute a vital pillar for food and economic security.
Accordingly, the agreement ensures the protection of Sudan’s population and its water and agricultural resources, placing it in a positive position to monitor dam operations, provided there is full adherence to the agreed rules, mechanisms, and joint committees.
Accordingly, there remain potential scenarios for the development of a new negotiation track under U.S. sponsorship. The first: if both Egypt and Ethiopia accept entering a negotiation round led by the United States, we would witness renewed engagement by international organizations such as the World Bank and the African Union as accompanying bridges to the negotiations, and an acceleration of technical mechanisms to define filling and operation rules for the dam, with written guarantees for water flow during drought and prolonged drought periods.
The second: the possibility of signing a new framework agreement that goes beyond the 2015 Declaration of Principles while building upon it, with more effective implementation and monitoring mechanisms. These paths would reassert the concept of international legitimacy in managing transboundary resources and undermine the logic of imposing faits accomplis.
The third: if U.S. mediation falters or Ethiopia refuses to return to dialogue, we may face diplomatic and security escalation in the form of exchanged statements, followed by reduced diplomatic representation or legal threats through international forums. Egypt may resort to raising the case before the United Nations or the International Court of Justice to demand enforcement mechanisms.
The possibility of economic or political sanctions against Ethiopia is not unlikely, particularly from international actors who view this file as a test of international law standards. Such escalation could push the region into a prolonged climate of tension, expanding divisions among Nile Basin states.
Thus, according to #The_Face_of_Truth, it is confirmed that the title of this article is an accurate description of an existing political reality: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the Dilemma of Water Security. It is a dilemma because its solution does not lie in the dam itself, but in the political will governing its operation, and in the ability to move from a logic of rigid sovereignty to one of binding partnership. If these movements are not invested in transforming international mediation into a serious track with a clear agreement and real guarantees, water security will remain an open question in the Nile Valley—deferred in answer, present in every crisis, and absent from any sustainable settlement.
Wishing you well and good health
Monday, January 19, 2026
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