The visit of President Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to the Turkish capital, Ankara, comes at a decisive political moment—one unlike previous foreign engagements—and cannot be read in isolation from the profound transformations shaking the Sudanese landscape since the outbreak of the April 2023 war. The visit, with its high-level Turkish representation and the political and security signals surrounding it, clearly indicates that Ankara is emerging as a potential pivotal actor in Sudan’s regional equation.
The official reception accorded to al-Burhan, the bilateral meeting with President Erdoğan, and the closed working luncheon that brought together key figures of the Turkish state from politics, defense, intelligence, and the defense industries all convey messages that go beyond diplomatic courtesy. They suggest that the Sudanese file has entered Turkish decision-making circles as an issue of regional security and strategic stability.
The timing of the visit is no less significant than its substance. Al-Burhan arrives in Ankara following a tour that included Riyadh and Cairo, amid intensifying competition among regional and international axes over Sudan, and growing attempts to re-engineer the political scene through parallel formulas to the state and its institutions. In this context, Turkey appears to be one of the few countries that has maintained a consistent position in support of Sudan’s unity and sovereignty, through its explicit rejection of division and the logic of a parallel government. This stance grants Turkey political and moral capital among broad segments of Sudanese society.
Sudanese–Turkish relations rest on deep historical roots dating back to the mid-sixteenth century, when Sudan served as Turkey’s gateway to Africa and a partner in geography, history, and interests. Yet this depth has often remained confined by hesitant decisions rather than evolving into an active partnership.
Today, amid an existential war threatening the Sudanese state, waiting is no longer viable, nor is it acceptable to manage relations through caution and equivocation.
The new reality imposes a different approach. Sudan needs strong regional allies who do not merely express sympathy, but who possess the capacity and will to provide political, security, and economic support. Turkey—with its experience in crisis management, regional influence, and advanced defense industries—is capable of playing this role, provided Sudan succeeds in harnessing the partnership within a strategic framework.
From here emerges the importance of reviving the strategic agreements signed during President Erdoğan’s historic visit to Khartoum in late 2017, which included more than twenty agreements across various fields. These agreements were never granted a full opportunity for implementation due to the political transformations following the fall of the Salvation regime, and the subsequent state of fluidity that engulfed the Sudanese state.
Today, in the view of many observers, the moment appears ripe to revisit these agreements as practical tools for building a genuine partnership—one that could extend to mutual defense agreements and security coordination serving the interests of both countries.
It is true that Ankara, until recently, preferred the position of a cautious observer of the Sudanese scene, and that the Sudanese leadership itself was wary of drawing closer to Turkey for fear of ideological interpretations by allies and adversaries alike. However, in light of the challenges our country faces, such calculations have become part of the past. The risks confronting Sudan today are greater than the scarecrows of political rhetoric, and far more complex than to be managed with a mindset of reservation and waiting.
Al-Burhan’s visit to Turkey, at this timing and with this meaning, is not merely a diplomatic stop, but an attempt to rearrange the cards and open new windows to possibilities previously unconsidered. It is a test of Khartoum’s ability to move from a policy of reaction to the building of conscious and deterrent alliances, and from crisis management to a serious search for partners in the battle for the survival of the state.
Accordingly, the real question is no longer: What does Turkey want from Sudan? Rather: What does Sudan expect from itself, and when will it make room for an ally who has proven—through words and position—that it stands with the state, not against it, and with the unity of the country, not at its expense?
Domestically, the visit was received with considerable relief among wide segments of Sudanese society, given the positive image Turkey holds in public consciousness as a state not associated with supporting divisions or undermining sovereignty, but one that has stood by state institutions. This credit grants al-Burhan broader internal acceptance compared to other foreign moves that have often triggered sharp polarization. Conversely, some civilian political forces may express cautious تحفظ—not a rejection of Turkey, but concern over any rapprochement with security dimensions that could be ideologically interpreted or politically exploited domestically.
Ankara’s approach is based on the principle that security is built, not imposed, and that weapons alone do not resolve wars. Accordingly, Turkey works through economic projects that restore hope and close the doors to chaos. This linkage between security and development represents a different entry point for restoring trust between the state and society. Sudanese citizens, exhausted by war, displacement, and the collapse of livelihoods, await tangible indicators that the state is capable of protecting them and reintegrating them into a genuine cycle of production. Here, Turkey’s importance emerges as a partner with practical experience in development work, through investment in infrastructure, agriculture, energy, mining, and capacity building.
At the level of the military and security institutions, the visit is likely to be viewed as a realistic step in the right direction, especially if it leads to qualitative support that enhances the state’s ability to endure and manage the transitional phase at the lowest possible cost.
Regionally, reactions will vary according to calculations of influence. It is expected that Saudi Arabia and Egypt will view the Sudanese–Turkish rapprochement with a degree of acceptance, as it supports their efforts aimed at stabilizing Sudan. Indeed, the Turkish role—if properly leveraged—may be seen as an additional balancing factor that limits interventions. Conversely, other regional actors will monitor this rapprochement with subdued caution, fearing that it may lead to a reshaping of security power balances.
Internationally, the visit will be read within a broader context related to the reconfiguration of influence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Western capitals will approach it with cautious pragmatism, recognizing Turkey’s weight as a regional player and a NATO member, while closely monitoring any shift from political cooperation to deep security partnerships that could take the management of the Sudanese crisis outside traditional frameworks. Russia and China, on the other hand, are unlikely to display sensitivity, so long as Khartoum maintains a policy of diversifying partnerships and employing them in the service of restoring security and peace.
Accordingly, the real wager, according to #The_Face_of_Truth, lies in whether this visit will translate into a partnership that rebuilds the state from the ground up, or whether it will remain another political moment added to the archive of deferred opportunities. Sudan today does not need allies who gamble on war, but partners who invest in peace as a developmental project that restores the country’s security, stability, and its pioneering role in leadership.
Wishing you well and good health
Saturday, 27 December 2025
Shglawi55@gmail.com
The Face of Truth | Ibrahim Shaglawi. Khartoum and Ankara: From the Memory of History to Security and Development
