The Prime Minister’s decision to reinstate Lina Yaqoub, Director of the Al Arabiya and Al Hadath bureaus, is a positive step that reveals subtle shifts in the management of power and media policy within the country. This decision came to close the chapter of her previous suspension issued by the Minister of Culture and Information, a decision that at the time appeared more reactive than reflective of the government’s policies, which seek a presence in the regional and international media space to reinforce its war-related narratives.
The Prime Minister’s personal call to Lina Yaqoub went beyond the usual procedure, and perhaps carried implicit messages: that the external media file is no longer solely the concern of the Ministry of Culture and Information, and that the higher authority views sensitive issues affecting the country’s image from a different angle.
Lina’s response came with celebratory tones not devoid of subtle sarcasm towards the minister. It combined gratitude with cautious hints, showing her understanding of the significance of the decision, while noting that steps toward professional reform have not yet closed the door to discussing the ministry’s policies.
The decision also reopened postponed questions about the nature of the relationship between the executive authority and the media, the limits of the minister’s mandate, the boundaries of professionalism, and the position of journalism in the narrative battle—which has become one of the major axes of contention in the conflict.
The Prime Minister’s latest move cannot be read in isolation from the previous decision issued by Minister of Information Khalid Al-Aisair to suspend Lina and withdraw her permits—a decision laden with justifications ranging from claims of professional violations, broadcasting sensitive information, and misleading the public. Between the suspension and the reinstatement, the gap in authority widened, revealing clearly that the government’s approach to media management remains fragile and tense, and that the decision-making mechanism oscillates between institutionalism and the desire to tailor the context for political purposes incompatible with media professionalism.
But the heart of the debate does not stop at the call or Lina’s statement; it expands to include what may be features of a new editorial policy that Al Arabiya and Al Hadath have begun adopting toward Sudan. These shifts can be read through three key indicators:
First: The brief interview conducted by the channel’s team dispatched to Port Sudan with the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council and Commander of the Army, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. Though it lasted ten minutes, it carried several clear political messages—some redefining the army’s position in the battle, and others directed at the region and the international community regarding Sudan’s stance toward the militia and the conditions for peace.
Second: The channels’ team accompanying Al-Burhan on a field tour, the most striking scene of which was the spontaneous popular crowding in Sabreen Market—a scene that presented a narrative different from others that had emphasized the political and popular isolation of the leadership. This media coverage contributed to reshaping part of the Sudanese public mood.
Third: The timing of Yaqoub’s return, which aligns with these shifts, suggesting the possibility that the two channels are repositioning themselves in the Sudanese arena, benefiting from wartime transformations and from the desire of parties within the government to knock on the doors of external media with a new vision that contributes to preparing for the next stage.
On the other side of the scene, reopening the door to Al Arabiya and Al Hadath appears to be a step that prepares the atmosphere for a larger diplomatic movement shaped by the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to stop the war. The anticipated Saudi pathway requires calm spaces and a less tense language between Khartoum and the media power centers that reflect the policies of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
From here, restoring the relationship with the two channels becomes part of managing the atmosphere, not managing the media. Riyadh, which is moving toward a complex settlement, needs a Sudanese environment that allows its messages to pass without noise, and needs open bridges that translate what it intends to convey and prepare local parties to receive its upcoming steps.
In contrast, it appears that Sudanese journalism—unfortunately—is unable to grasp the gravity of the moment. Every week it trails behind shallow issues imposed by digital platforms or perhaps intelligence bodies: from the Prime Minister’s absence, to a statue, to a flag, to flies in Port Sudan, to the chase of a journalist expelled from the city.
Meanwhile, the major battle is being fought on an entirely different front: the arena of narrative, media disinformation, the struggle over legitimacy, and the imposition of international guardianship. These small issues do not fall upon public opinion by coincidence—they are part of a meticulous, professionally arranged engineering to distract attention from the war and its challenges.
Thus, according to #Face_of_Truth, the Prime Minister’s decision becomes a page in a political book in which all parties play their roles: the government in restoring its trust with the media, the channels in redefining their role, and Saudi Arabia in creating the suitable atmosphere for its initiative.
In this theater, media remains a strategic tool that shapes the narrative, stabilizes messages, and rearranges the scene in a way that paves the ground for any initiative to end the war. Al Arabiya / Al Hadath—from suspension to restoring trust—reveal the complexities of the stage, and it becomes imperative for Sudanese media to grasp the depth and danger of the moment and keep pace with transformations objectively, to be a true partner in shaping stability and protecting the security and future of the country.
May you remain well and safe.
Sunday, 7 November 2025
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