الإثنين, فبراير 2, 2026
الرئيسيةمقالاتFace of Truth | Ibrahim Shaglawi. ...

Face of Truth | Ibrahim Shaglawi. The Russian Base and the Tactics of Finger-Biting

The war that Sudan has witnessed since April 15, 2023, after the Rapid Support Militia attempted to seize power with regional backing and support from some political forces, has revealed the country’s transformation into an arena for great-power competition over the security of maritime routes. In this reality, Sudan is trying to test its political and security cards in pursuit of stability, the restoration of security, and the attainment of some influence.

The Wall Street Journal revealed that Sudan offered Russia the establishment of its first naval base in Africa. This strategic step grants Moscow a permanent foothold on the Red Sea and raises concerns in Washington.

According to sources, the proposal grants Russia the right to use the base for 25 years, including the deployment of about 300 soldiers and four warships—including nuclear-powered vessels—at Port Sudan or another naval facility, while Sudan receives advanced air-defense systems and preferential-priced weapons deals to strengthen the army’s capabilities against the Rapid Support Militia. The agreement goes beyond the military aspect, granting Russia economic privileges in the mining and energy sectors.

Amid these leaks, the Russian ambassador to Khartoum, Chernovol, stated that the document regarding the base is “old” and that procedures have stalled due to the war in Sudan. He added that the request submitted in 2022 made no progress and requires official approval before any practical step. This official denial reveals the tension between Russia’s military ambitions and its diplomatic caution toward Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Washington—turning the Sudanese file into a stage for finger-biting tactics among local, regional, and international players.

In this context, a clear American movement began, with statements by Secretary of State Marco Rubio affirming that President Trump is personally overseeing the Sudan file, away from envoys. This reflects Washington’s recognition that the Sudanese situation has become important, and that any leniency in managing Russian or Emirati influence could alter the rules of the game in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

The timing of the media leak on the Russian file was not innocent. Accusations point to the UAE—under heavy international pressure due to its support for the militia—attempting to portray the Sudanese army as a Russian ally to force Washington to reassess its position. Yet the result was the opposite: it pushed Washington to intervene directly, coordinating with Riyadh to shut down any potential Russian influence—a qualitative shift in managing the Sudanese crisis.

Sudan, benefiting from these leaks, began using the Russia card as a tactic to pressure Washington to adjust its policies, which attempted to equate the army with the militia and ignored Emirati military support. The goal is to strengthen the army’s position, stabilize its control, and adopt its vision regarding the implementation of the Jeddah Agreement on security arrangements, signed on May 11, 2023, ensuring a swift end to the war.

The emergence of the Russian base file at this time is part of a broader battle managed in secret and surfacing occasionally. The war, which began as an armed rebellion, quickly turned into a regional conflict intertwining money, weapons, and politics, with the interests of states fearing that Khartoum might fall into the hands of a project that redraws maps at the expense of Red Sea and waterway security. At the heart of this scene, the Sudanese army has come to treat the war as existential.

Here, understanding the “finger-biting tactics” becomes essential. Sudan knows the United States cannot accept a Russian base on the Red Sea, and that Saudi Arabia will not allow a strategic vacuum to be filled by forces threatening the stability of its sphere of influence. As for Egypt, which views the Red Sea as an extension of the security of the Suez Canal, it sees any Russian deployment near Bab al-Mandeb as a direct threat to its defensive equation.

With these complex calculations, Sudan used the Moscow card to redefine its position in the equation and force Washington to shift from a “balancing actors” policy to a “decisive stance.” This shift has already begun to appear in recent weeks, as the U.S. administration started dealing directly with Riyadh and Khartoum, bypassing Abu Dhabi’s mediation—which it had used to support the militia.

Meanwhile, the UAE, which built over the past years a wide network of influence stretching from the Horn of Africa to Yemen, found itself in its most difficult moment since its founding, after its role in the Darfur genocide was exposed, its international standing declined, and political and media pressure on it increased. The latest leak—intended to undermine the Sudanese army by portraying it as a Russian ally—backfired, pushing Washington to handle the Sudanese file with caution that cannot be left to proxies.

At the same time, Moscow is trying to play the balance game wisely. It wants a foothold in the Red Sea but understands that any uncalculated step may clash with the interests of Egypt and Saudi Arabia—both key partners in the region. This is why Sergey Shoigu’s visit to Cairo came as a reassuring message, as if Moscow were saying: our potential presence in Sudan is not aimed against you. Yet Cairo remained unconvinced, knowing that any Russian base south of the Suez Canal would change the rules of the game in the long term.

The Sudanese scene unfolds as a complex layer of conflict where desires to prolong the war intersect with shifting supply networks and shadow deals that reshape the map as American moods change. Despite this entanglement, the army managed to regain the initiative, making it an actor that cannot be bypassed in any future formula, while international pressure on the militia grows and the term “genocide” expands in Western discourse as an undeniable reality.

According to #Wajh_AlHaqiqa, between Moscow’s pressure, Washington’s calculations, Cairo’s fears, Riyadh’s insistence on ending the war, and the UAE’s exhaustion of its cards, Sudan now finds itself at the center of its most sensitive phase in decades—a stage where spheres of influence are redrawn, state wills are tested, and Sudan stands as a real actor capable of reshaping the region through its winning cards, provided the decision-maker manages this delicate balance between the necessities of war, the requirements of sovereignty, and the conditions of international partnerships.

Wishing you well and good health.

Thursday, December 4, 2025
Shglawi55@gmail.com

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