The battle of Al-Fashir appears as a defining moment in the course of the Sudanese war, an event that revealed the true face of the conflict and redefined the nature and boundaries of the war. This time, the battlefield was not merely between an army and a militia, but between a nation defending its sovereignty and a regional system seeking to reshape the political geography in service of its interests and agendas.
The manner in which the battle was managed—neutralizing communication systems and meticulously cutting the lines between the army’s field forces and command centers—clearly indicates that what happened in Al-Fashir was the result of intelligence planning supported by third-party technologies possessing electronic warfare tools and precise knowledge of the Sudanese military structure.
This development places the war in Sudan within a new context. It is no longer an internal conflict born of the militia’s coup on April 15, 2023, but an open regional confrontation in which the wills of states and projects of influence are being tested.
The same forces that fought the wars in Libya and Yemen—through their financial, media, and military arms—have returned to Sudan to reproduce the same equation: a state drained from within, and external actors redrawing its borders and balances to secure their interests and establish a foothold in the heart of Africa, on the shores of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.
Yet Sudan differs from those experiences in that it has not lost the cohesion of its national institutions. The army remains present, retaining its popular support, deep roots, and professional doctrine, which distinguishes it from the Libyan model, where the state disintegrated, or the Yemeni model, where national decision-making eroded.
However, this cohesion remains threatened unless the ongoing transformations are viewed through political and diplomatic, not merely military, lenses—and unless national awareness is translated into a firm and creative strategy that anticipates dangers and manages the scene with a cool mind rather than the impulse of the moment.
Today, war extends beyond rifles to systems of control, information, and decision-making. The Battle of Al-Fashir, which witnessed more than 270 consecutive attacks on the city, was a true test of the Sudanese army’s ability to withstand nontraditional tools of warfare: from media pressure to technological infiltration, and from diplomatic isolation to economic blockade.
These are the same tools used by regional actors in previous experiences to re-engineer balances in Libya, Syria, and Yemen—funding militias and using humanitarian slogans as cover for grand geopolitical projects that robbed those nations of their security and stability.
What the UAE is doing in Sudan today is not new in method. Just as it financed military arms in Libya to undermine the central state under the banner of “fighting terrorism,” and supported groups in Yemen to divide spheres of influence under the slogan of “combating the Houthis,” it now finances and backs the Rapid Support Forces militia in Sudan, in an attempt to establish a new reality granting it control over gold, oil, livestock, and water resources, while securing a strategic foothold on the Red Sea.
It is now clear that the war in Sudan is no longer between an army and a militia, but between conflicting regional projects: one seeking to keep Sudan fragile and open to political and security exploitation, and another striving for the return of a free state capable of controlling its national decision.
The danger lies in the fact that these projects are managed under a silent international cover, and that the global system—supposed to deter violations—has become part of the equation through the complicity of interests and the balancing of maritime routes and ports.
This project, managed under the banners of “mediation” and “humanitarian work,” is nothing but a reproduction of the Libyan model, but on a broader, more dangerous geography, one that is more solid and experienced in resistance. Confronting this challenge, Sudan’s options remain open—but require precise calculation.
The visit of the high-ranking Egyptian military delegation to Port Sudan on Thursday, led by Chief of Staff General Ahmed Fathi, which coincided with the fall of Al-Fashir, cannot be read outside the context of joint defensive movements between the two countries.
Cairo, aware that its security begins from Sudan’s southern borders, sees Sudan’s slide into militia chaos as a direct threat to its vital domain. Therefore, the activation of the joint defense agreement between the two countries is now strongly on the table, as a geopolitical necessity to protect the integrated national security of Sudan and Egypt.
In contrast, Turkey remains another strategic option available to Khartoum, given its experience in supporting governments without infringing on their sovereignty—as it did in Libya, helping the state regain field balance without imposing political guardianship.
Moreover, Ankara’s deep historical ties with Khartoum and its reservoir of mutual trust make defense and technological cooperation with it a practical path to strengthening national capabilities without dependency.
Yet the essence of vision should not be alignment but the engineering of balance. Sudan must forge its own equation—one that harmonizes the Egyptian school of regional security and diplomacy with the Turkish school of technological modernization and productive cooperation.
Only through such balance can Sudan restore its position and readiness for the worst scenarios, protecting its security and sovereign decision in a region torn by new colonial projects that recognize nothing but the calculus of interests.
According to experts, the Battle of Al-Fashir has redefined the war in Sudan and revealed that national awareness is the first line of defense before any weapon. Wars are not won only on the battlefield but also in memory—in the ability of nations to distinguish between friends and opportunists.
The world that remained silent over the atrocities in Darfur is the same one that betrayed the peoples of Libya, Yemen, and Palestine. Today is tested once again in Al-Fashir, where humanity and morality stand on trial, exposing the falsity of international discourse that moves only to the rhythm of interests, not principles.
Sudan today is fighting a battle that transcends geography—it is a battle for existence itself. A battle waged through awareness as much as through arms, measured by the Sudanese people’s ability to turn tragedy into a moment of renewed national consciousness. When Al-Fashir becomes a mirror of human conscience, blood turns into testimony, and catastrophe into a compass that reveals who stands with Sudan and who stands against it.
Sudan’s true chance to overcome this impasse does not lie in an externally imposed settlement, but in strengthening national decision-making and creating a new regional balance based on equality, not subordination.
All previous experiences have shown that nations which reclaimed their sovereign decision—as Ethiopia did after the Tigray war, or Chad after successive coups—were able to reposition themselves regionally despite military weakness.
What is required, then, alongside the crafting of viable and productive alliances, is a national political project that redefines Sudan as an active player, not a sphere of influence; transforming the loss in Al-Fashir into a launching point for a new national narrative that balances resistance to aggression with the building of an effective Sudanese state.
According to #Face_of_Truth, these are the limits of national awareness tested by war. From the womb of chaos, awareness is born; through will and wise management, nations that know their path rise again. And Sudan—as throughout its history—will not be defeated so long as its awareness is alive, its memory open, its decision sovereign, and its people conscious of the gravity of the moment and its challenges.
Stay safe and well.
Saturday, November 1, 2025
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