The Government of Hope convened early this week to approve the 2026 annual plan. And although the meeting carried a national desire to restore social cohesion, a careful reading reveals gaps that cannot be overlooked, and missing priorities that will determine whether this plan marks the beginning of a new path that restores the state’s authority and gives society a chance to breathe and transition into a new phase.
The plan, as announced, focused on social recovery, Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue, reconstruction, and activating productive sectors. These are themes no two people would disagree on, yet they remain broad headings in a country that can no longer tolerate generalities.
Sudan today stands at a stage where it is impossible to speak of “social cohesion” unless state institutions return to work. There is no meaning to “reconstruction” without a map that defines where the road begins and where the electricity networks—cut off from half the country—end. There is no use for “dialogue” unless its framework, its parties, and its national guarantor are clearly defined. The engines driving this dialogue remain far removed from the challenges of the moment and from the national project.
The first gap revealed by a close reading is the absence of discussion on rebuilding state institutions. Services cannot function without institutions, and development cannot move without an administrative apparatus. The war caused deep distortions in the civil service, disrupted civil registries, courts, and prosecution offices, and weakened the police force. Nevertheless, the plan did not address operational support for these pillars upon which the state’s structure rests.
Measuring progress begins with the return of institutions to work and with the time it takes for a citizen to obtain essential services linked to daily life.
Sudan today needs a plan that links institutional return with development projects, rehabilitates infrastructure, activates local and manufacturing industries, develops mining and agricultural projects, supports small producers, improves the quality of education, medical insurance, and services, and maintains roads—so that 2026 becomes an actual phase of restarting the state, rather than suspended promises. Otherwise, the coming year will become a difficult test, and the same political, economic, social, and development mistakes may be repeated.
A crucial question arises: Does the government realize that 2026 is not an ordinary year? It is the year in which the resilience of the state will be tested, the year that will reveal the authority’s ability to manage the post-war reality and neutralize external influence seeking to drag the Sudanese scene into political solutions drafted outside national will.
In this test, merely talking about voluntary return or basic services will not suffice. What is required is rebuilding state institutions as a first condition, reforming financial performance as a second, and launching clear development projects as a third. These pillars give the plan its spirit and make it a measurable document. Therefore, the plan must be built on projects and programs.
The plan has also overlooked the core of the war, which caused the collapse of administrative institutions, the fragmentation of the social fabric, and the loss of productive foundations. Without addressing the consequences of the war through a clear national program that includes social justice, the reopening of schools, universities, hospitals, telecommunications, services, and community security, every step taken by the government will remain on fragile ground prone to cracking.
Economically, the plan appears to need greater boldness. The country needs four leading sectors to be invested in quickly: agriculture, which can restore food balance; livestock and minerals, which represent sources of foreign currency; and light industry, capable of creating jobs for youth.
Without announcing specific projects with timelines, talk of “improving economic indicators” will remain an empty phrase with no weight.
The situation grows even more complicated when we reach the absence of a development vision. The plan did not specify a single project that could serve as a foundation for economic revival, nor did it set a timeline or measurable indicators. The country needs a clear national program for voluntary return, compensation for the affected, assessment of the destruction of properties and infrastructure, and restoration of security—without which stability is meaningless.
Politically, the national dialogue can be a historic opportunity if managed wisely, and it can turn into a vortex if left without will. Political forces must recognize that Sudan can no longer bear the old elite battles, and that internal cohesion is the basis of any sincere national initiative that transcends conflicts.
The Government of Hope, according to Face of Truth, stands at a decisive moment: either it presents a plan that reflects its name, or it falls into the trap of generalities that previous governments failed in. The real plan is not what is written, but what is implemented on the ground—in the villages awaiting the return of services, in the states that need effective police and judiciary, in the industries waiting for electricity, and in agriculture awaiting water-harvesting projects. Such effort gives the plan a name, gives the work impact, and gives the citizen security.
Wishing you goodness and well-being.
Thursday, 11 December 2025
Shglawi55@gmail.com
