Reactions to President al-Burhan’s address before the army leaders, and to the Saudi-American initiative, appear much like a surrealist canvas of multiple compositions, where political calculations intertwine with regional and international balances, alongside the pulse of a Sudanese street that can no longer tolerate even the mention of the militia’s return.
The military platform that al-Burhan wisely chose witnessed the presence of all military leaders, senior officers, unit commanders, the commander-in-chief’s aides, the general staff, and intelligence and police commanders. The only absentee was Lt. Gen. Kabashi, who is recovering in Cairo. This complete gathering sent a dual message: first, to the inside, that the army and all forces are unified and ready to confront the rebellion; and second, to the outside, that imposing any solution without regard to state sovereignty will be rejected.
From the perspective of the military institution, greater cohesion around al-Burhan’s speech is expected, as the address reaffirmed the narrative of the war as a battle to defend the state, not to defend power. Such speeches usually increase field commanders’ confidence and strengthen internal unity, yet at the same time they raise military expectations, making any later concessions in negotiations more sensitive within the army itself. However, armies that have fought long wars often understand that firmness in rhetoric does not negate the need for a political exit.
In his statement about “continuing the battle until the state is restored,” it was clear that al-Burhan was not speaking only to his forces, but also to the international community, to his opponents, and to political actors awaiting clarity on the post-war landscape.
This speech cannot be understood in isolation from the return of the Jeddah Platform to the forefront. The commander-in-chief wanted to remind that the military institution is not a party that can be bypassed, and that entering any negotiation process cannot be built on the illusion of tried-and-failed ceasefires, but on a solid and realistic balance that determines the form and timing of the endgame.
Hence the message was clear: the army, regardless of pressures, sees itself as the sole guarantor of state unity and the leading voice in upcoming transitional arrangements, especially amid the weakness and fragmentation of political parties.
Domestically, al-Burhan’s speech reinforced internal cohesion and sent clear signals to the Sudanese street and political forces that the army will not allow a repeat of past experiences, and that any civilian or political actor who does not respect state sovereignty will not be part of the negotiation’s future. In contrast, the Rapid Support Forces militia found itself confronted with a clear ceiling: no peace with the militia remaining an independent force in the cities or outside the framework of the state, coupled with an implicit threat of possible military action to regain control of the hot zones in Kordofan and Darfur.
But this speech—with all its firmness—does not negate a more complex reality. Al-Burhan’s reference to the fact that “the battle is not the army’s battle alone” reflects an understanding that the war will not be resolved militarily alone, and that negotiations will not constitute defeat if they come in a form that preserves the country’s unity, balances, and sovereignty.
The address emphasized that Saudi Arabia is viewed as a neutral party capable of recalibrating the negotiation balance, while the UAE was cast under scrutiny as a biased actor, and that any mediation involving Abu Dhabi would be rejected.
Regionally, Saudi Arabia will monitor al-Burhan’s speech with a dual lens: one that values his message on state and military unity, and another seeking indicators of openness to the political track. Riyadh understands that military firmness is needed to enforce seriousness within the negotiations, but also recognizes that excessive rigidity could complicate prospects for success. Therefore, it will work to link the speech to a practical vision for confidence-building measures, while neutralizing the actors al-Burhan referenced, including U.S. envoy Mossad Paulos.
The United States, meanwhile, will view the messages in the speech through a pragmatic lens: does this mean the army is ready for negotiations under clear guarantees? Or does it signal a new phase of military insistence? Likely, Washington will rely on its assessment of the field situation to gauge the army’s seriousness toward the political track. Should it conclude that the speech does not contradict an intention to engage, it will increase pressure on the other side to accept a long-term humanitarian ceasefire.
As for the UAE, its reaction is expected to be more cautious. Its absence from the new initiative platform may be interpreted in Abu Dhabi as a redrawing of influence balances in Sudan. It may therefore attempt to influence events from behind the scenes to maintain a role in any future arrangements, but its maneuvering capacity will be reduced after global sentiment shifted following the brutal violations in al-Fashir and the exposure of its role.
Egypt, meanwhile, received an implicit message urging it to reevaluate its position, especially since its support for the Quartet is no longer aligned with Sudan’s strategic interests. Thus, Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar may move toward a new assessment of the situation. Cairo will view al-Burhan’s speech as affirming the army’s role—something consistent with its own long-held vision of Sudan—while Ankara and Doha will see the initiative as an opportunity for engagement if invited, given Qatar’s experience in the Darfur peace and regional security.
The statement by Turkish President Erdoğan to Reuters added a new dimension to the scene, confirming that Sudan requested Ankara’s participation in efforts to end the war and achieve peace, and that Turkey would do its utmost. Turkey’s involvement is seen as an important balancing lever, not as a substitute for the Gulf or American mediators, as it gives Khartoum broader negotiating space and relieves external pressure.
Here emerges the dimension of potential alliances, which now holds greater strategic importance: Sudan, through its resilience, retains wide options with Russia and China, including the Russian naval base on the Red Sea, which grants it the ability to create real regional balance against external pressure attempts.
Khartoum thus appears as an actor capable of protecting its interests and maritime corridors while maintaining flexibility in alliances. This strategic posture gives Sudan significant political and diplomatic leverage and prevents any international actor from imposing a coercive solution akin to the Russian-Ukrainian war settlement model.
Expected scenarios for external reactions fall into three paths:
First, a positive adaptation by the United States and Saudi Arabia to adjust the initiative’s formulation in a manner that respects Sudan’s sovereignty, with Turkish and Qatari participation as balancing forces.
Second, political and diplomatic pressure to compel Khartoum into partial concessions.
Third, a stalemate scenario, in which the war continues at a slower but more complex pace, potentially pushing Sudan to expand its armament options.
And no matter how sharp al-Burhan’s speech may appear, it is essentially a declaration of a conditioned transitional phase, rather than an outright rejection of any settlement. It is a speech that raises military expectations in order to reduce the political cost later.
This is a familiar language in pre-negotiation contexts, where parties bolster their image of strength before entering any agreement. What is new, however, is its timing: it came at a moment when the international community began reassessing its positions, opening the door to a shared vision for ceasefire, transition, and reconstruction.
According to #Face_of_Truth, al-Burhan’s address redefined the rules of negotiation. Sudan rejects any solution that leaves the militia as a force within the cities, insists on its withdrawal and disarmament, and affirms that any political settlement must be built upon state institutions, not on proxies or biased mediators. The path from the army’s platform to the negotiation table will not be smooth, but it has begun to take shape on the basis of state sovereignty and the will of Sudanese citizens.
Wishing you well and in good health.
Tuesday, 25 November 2025
Shglawi55@gmail.com
