It seems that our country has entered a new phase in managing the crisis—a phase that goes beyond the logic of responding to external initiatives toward redefining its regional and international relations based on sovereignty and equality. The recent official stance on the “Quartet,” which includes the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, represented a calculated step marking a shift in Khartoum’s perception of the meaning of international mediation.
When Foreign Minister Mohieldin Salem stated that Sudan would maintain its relations with the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt based on mutual interests and equal relations, and that the Quartet was not a legitimate body since it was not established by a United Nations Security Council resolution, he was laying the foundation for a new political transformation with a clear title: Sudan will not deal with any collective framework that surpasses its sovereignty or its national institutions.
With this position, Khartoum stripped the Quartet of the monopoly on mediation it sought to impose and shifted the crisis from a state of internationalization to a Sudanese-regional understanding track. Reliance on external initiatives implicitly means acceptance that the crisis is being managed from abroad, which contradicts the national narrative adopted by the government since the outbreak of the war—considering it a battle against an armed rebellion targeting the very existence of the state.
At the recent tripartite meeting that included the Sudanese Foreign Minister, his Egyptian counterpart, and the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, the issue of mercenaries recruited by the Rapid Support Forces militia from various countries—some from Latin America and West Africa—was raised. The minister affirmed that “these people have no cause other than killing, looting, and dragging,” calling on the international community to name things as they are if it truly wants to address the crisis honestly.
This frank discourse reflects a shift in Sudanese diplomacy toward linking the humanitarian tragedy with the regional risks of foreign interventions, thereby granting Sudan growing political sympathy and reinforcing its legitimacy in confronting a rebellion supported from abroad.
In parallel, Egypt’s role has clearly emerged in the Sudanese file. The visit of Egyptian Foreign Minister Dr. Badr Abdel Aaty to Port Sudan and his meeting with President Al-Burhan came at a sensitive time, affirming that Cairo has chosen the position of a strategic ally, not that of a supportive mediator.
The minister described “Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity as an existential issue,” affirming Egypt’s full support for Sudanese state institutions.
This new approach places Sudanese–Egyptian relations within the framework of a partnership that goes beyond political symbolism to actual security and strategic coordination, and perhaps even activation of the joint defense agreement if necessary.
In contrast, the United Nations’ entry into the humanitarian work line was an important development—but conditional. Khartoum accepted cooperation with the UN organization on the condition of respecting its sovereignty and not turning the humanitarian file into a gateway for internationalizing the conflict.
Thus, Sudan succeeded in transforming the UN presence from a tool of pressure into a platform for practical partnership, while the United Nations dealt with the matter realistically, implicitly acknowledging the Sudanese state’s authority in managing relief and humanitarian affairs.
Amid this transformation, General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan emerged as the chief architect of the “realistic legitimacy” approach—based on field control and respect for state institutions. In his recent statements, Al-Burhan rejected any truce imposed from abroad, affirming that “the fall of Al-Fashir will not weaken the state, and it will be regained.”
This firm discourse sent a clear message: no settlement imposed outside Sudanese state institutions will be accepted. His public criticism of the Emirati stance and his accusation of Abu Dhabi of supporting the rebel militia, in the presence of the U.S. envoy Masad Boulos, marked a new confidence in Sudan’s diplomatic discourse.
It appears that Sudan has begun to wisely benefit from the wave of official and popular international sympathy that followed the Rapid Support Forces militia’s entry into the city of Al-Fashir and the atrocities committed against civilians—condemned by humanitarian organizations and governments, including the United States itself.
Khartoum invested this sympathy to strengthen its narrative that what is happening is not an internal rebellion but rather “a foreign invasion by militias and mercenaries.” The Foreign Minister and all Sudanese diplomatic missions abroad, through press meetings they held, described the events as “a direct invasion” and emphasized that the government will continue its serious efforts to expel what they called “the militias and mercenaries” from the country.
Thus, Sudan turns the tables on the Quartet by redefining the rules of the game. The equation has changed: neither Washington nor Abu Dhabi can impose their previous conditions after Turkey and Qatar entered areas of influence, while growing coordination with Cairo and Riyadh has made Sudan a new intersection point in the region. Consequently, Port Sudan has turned into a political center of gravity from which the regional rhythm is managed—after it was previously only a base for security, relief, and humanitarian operations.
It can be said that this position will open three potential paths in the near term. The first is the deepening of the Egyptian–Sudanese alliance, which may develop into a coordinated political and security axis that transcends the current crisis to include Nile Basin and Red Sea regional security issues.
The second is the possible emergence of a parallel mediation effort from Turkey and Qatar seeking to fill the vacuum left by the Quartet’s retreat, creating a new balance between competing regional blocs. The third path is the partial re-internationalization of the crisis through the United Nations if regional efforts fail to impose a field-level calm, which could return the conflict to the Security Council table in accordance with the Sudanese roadmap.
According to #Face_of_Truth, what is happening indicates that Sudan is no longer in a position of political defense but has become an active player with a vision, a stance, and multiple options. Between the Quartet’s decline and the rise of new regional alliances, between the field challenge and humanitarian engagement, Sudan is writing a new chapter in its national history—its main title: legitimacy is not granted from abroad, but seized from within and imposed through steadfastness and the ability to redefine the self before the world.
Wishing you well and good health,
Thursday, November 13, 2025
Shglawi55@gmail.com
